62 . Furthermore, they show a pseudo-near-collision for Tiger reduced to 22 rounds with a complexity of about 2 44 . No attack is known for the full Tiger hash function. In this article, we show a pseudo-near-collision for the full Tiger hash function with a complexity of about 2 47 hash computations and a pseudocollision (free-start-collision) for Tiger reduced to 23 rounds with the same complexity.
Introduction
Tiger is a cryptographic iterated hash function that processes 512-bit blocks and produces a 192-bit hash value. It was proposed by Anderson and Biham in 1996. Recent results in the cryptanalysis of Tiger show weaknesses in round-reduced variants of the hash function. At FSE 2006, Kelsey and Lucks presented a collision attack on 16 and 17 (out of 24) rounds of Tiger. The attack has a complexity of about 2 44 evaluations of the compression function. Furthermore, they present a pseudo-near-collision for a variant of Tiger reduced to 20 rounds with a complexity of about 2 48 . These results were later improved by Mendel et al. in [3] . They show that a collision can be found for Tiger reduced to 19 rounds with a complexity of about 2 62 evaluations of the compression function. Furthermore, they present a pseudo-near-collision for Tiger reduced to 22 rounds with a complexity of about 2 44 . However, so far no attack is known for the full Tiger hash function.
In this article, we present a 1-bit circular pseudo-near-collision for the full Tiger hash function with a complexity of about 2 47 hash computations and a pseudo-collision (free-start-collision) for a variant of Tiger reduced to 23 rounds with the same complexity. The attack is based on previous attacks presented in [2] and [3] . Note that in the attacks of Kelsey and Lucks and Mendel et al. on round-reduced variants of Tiger, the S-boxes of the hash function are addressed wrongly (big endian instead of little endian). However, this error can be fixed easily, because there is really a large amount of freedom in these attacks on round-reduced variants of Tiger.
The remainder of this article is structured as follows. A description of the Tiger hash function is given in Section 2. In Section 3, we describe the basic attack strategy on Tiger based on the work of Kelsey and Lucks on round-reduced Tiger. We follow this attack strategy in Section 4 to construct a 1-bit circular pseudo-near-collision for Tiger with a complexity of about 2 47 . In Section 5, we show a pseudo-collision for Tiger reduced to 23 rounds with the same complexity. Finally, we present conclusions in Section 6.
Description of the Hash Function Tiger
Tiger is a cryptographic hash function that was designed by Anderson and Biham in 1996 [1] . It is an iterative hash function that processes 512-bit input message blocks and produces a 192-bit hash value. In the following, we briefly describe the hash function. It basically consists of two parts: the key schedule and the state update transformation. A detailed description of the hash function is given in [1] . For the remainder of this article, we will follow the notation given in Table 1 . 
State Update Transformation
The state update transformation of Tiger starts from a (fixed) initial value IV of three 64-bit words and updates them in three passes of eight rounds each. In each round one 64-bit word X is used to update the three state variables A, B and C as follows:
The results are then shifted such that A, B, C become B, C, A. Fig. 1 shows one round of the state update transformation of Tiger. The non-linear functions even and odd used in each round are defined as follows:
where state variable C is split into eight bytes c 7 , . . . , c 0 with c 7 is the most significant byte (and not c 0 ). Four S-boxes T 1 , . . . , T 4 : {0, 1} 8 → {0, 1} 64 are used to compute the output of the non-linear functions even and odd. For the definition of the S-boxes we refer to [1] . Note that state variable B is multiplied with the constant mult ∈ {5, 7, 9} at the end of each round. The value of the constant is different in each pass of the Tiger hash function.
After the last round of the state update transformation, the initial values A −1 , B −1 , C −1 and the output values of the last round A 23 , B 23 , C 23 are combined, resulting in the final value of one iteration (feed forward). The result is the final hash value or the initial value for the next message block.
Key Schedule
The key schedule is an invertible function which ensures that changing a small number of bits in the message will affect a lot of bits in the next pass. While the message words X 0 , . . . , X 7 are used in the first pass to update the state variables, the remaining 16 message words, 8 for the second pass and 8 for the third pass, are generated by applying the key schedule as follows:
The key schedule modifies the inputs (Y 0 , . . . , Y 7 ) in two steps:
The final values (Y 0 , . . . , Y 7 ) are the output of the key schedule and the message words for the next pass.
Basic Attack Strategy
In this section, we briefly describe the attack strategy of Kelsey and Lucks to attack round-reduced variants of the Tiger hash function. A detailed description of the attack is given in [2] . For a good understanding of our attack it is recommended to study it carefully. The attack can be summarized as follows.
1. Find a characteristic for the key schedule of Tiger which holds with high probability. In the ideal case this probability is 1. 2. Use a kind of message modification technique developed for Tiger to construct certain differences in the state variables, which can then be canceled by the differences of the message words in the following rounds.
These two steps of the attack are described in detail in the following sections.
Finding a good Characteristic for the Key Schedule of Tiger
To find a good characteristic for the key schedule of Tiger, we use a linearized model of the key schedule. Therefore, we replace all modular additions and subtractions by an XOR operation resulting in a linear code over GF (2) . Finding a characteristic in the linear code is not difficult, since it depends only on the differences in the message words. The probability that the characteristic holds in the original key schedule of Tiger is related to the Hamming weight of the characteristic. In general, a characteristic with low Hamming weight has a higher probability than one with a high Hamming weight.
For finding a characteristic with high probability (low Hamming weight), we use probabilistic algorithms from coding theory. It has been shown in the past (cryptanalysis of SHA-1 [4] ) that these algorithms work quite well. Furthermore, we can impose additional restrictions on the characteristic by forcing certain bits/words to zero. Note that this is needed to find suitable characteristics for the key schedule of Tiger. For an attack on the Tiger hash function we need many zeros in the first and last rounds of the hash function.
Message Modification by Meet-in-the-Middle
In order to construct a collision in Tiger reduced to 16 rounds, Kelsey and Lucks use a message modification technique developed for Tiger. The idea of message modification in general is to use the degree of freedom one has in the choice of the message words to fulfill conditions on the state variables. In the attack on Tiger this method is used to construct a certain differential pattern in the state variables, which can then be canceled by the differences of the message words in the following rounds. This leads to a collision in a round reduced variant of Tiger. In the following we will briefly describe this message modification technique according to Fig. 2 .
Assume, we are given
. Then the modular difference ∆ (C i+1 ) can be forced to be any difference δ with a probability of 2 −1 by using a birthday attack. We try out all 2 32 possibilities for X i−1 [odd] to generate 2 32 candidates for ∆ (odd(B i )). Similarly, we try out all X i [even] to generate 2 32 candidates for ∆ (even(B i+1 )). Subsequently, we use a meet-in-the-middle approach to solve the following equation:
The method can be summarized as follows: 
This technique needs about 2
36 bytes of storage and takes 2 33 evaluations of each of the functions odd and even. This is equivalent to about 2 29 evaluations of the compression function of Tiger. 
A Pseudo-Near-Collision for Tiger
In this section, we will present a 1-bit circular pseudo-near-collision for the Tiger hash function. Note that the difference in the final hash value is the same as in the initial value. In other words, we have a pseudo-collision in the compression function of Tiger after 24 rounds, but due to the feed forward the collision after 24 rounds is destroyed, resulting in a 1-bit pseudo-near-collision for the Tiger hash function. The attack has a complexity of about 2 47 evaluations of the compression function. In the attack, we extend techniques invented by Kelsey and Lucks in the attack on round-reduced variants of Tiger.
We use the characteristic given below for the key schedule of Tiger to construct the pseudo-near-collision in the hash function. This characteristic holds with a probability of 2 −1 which facilitates the attack. In order to have a pseudo-collision in the compression function of Tiger after 24 rounds, it is required that there is a pseudo-collision after round 17. Hence, the following differences are needed in the state variables for round 14 of Tiger (see Table 2 ).
Constructing these differences in the state variables for round 14 is the most difficult part of the attack. We use the message modification technique described in Section 3.2 for this. In the following sections, we will describe all steps of the attack in detail. Table 2 . Characteristic for a 1-bit pseudo-near-collision in the Tiger hash function.
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Precomputation
The precomputation step basically consists of 2 parts. First, we have to find a set L of possible modular differences L + which are consistent to a low weight
Let L be the set of modular differences L + which are consistent to the XOR-difference L ⊕ then we define the set L of possible modular differences as follows:
Note that the size of the set L is related to the Hamming weight of L ⊕ , namely |L | = 2
HW(L ⊕
. In order to optimize the complexity of the meet-in-the-middle step used in the attack, we need an L ⊕ with low Hamming weight. In [2] , the authors assume that an L ⊕ with Hamming weight of 8 exists. However, the best Hamming weight we found for L ⊕ is 10.
In total we found 502 = |L| possible modular differences (out of 1024 = |L |) which are consistent to the XOR-difference L ⊕ given above. This facilitates the attack in the following steps.
Second, we need a set K of possible modular differences K + which are consistent to a low weight XOR-difference K ⊕ .
where K is the set of modular differences K + which are consistent to the XORdifference K ⊕ . Of course, the choice of L ⊕ and the number of possible modular differences L + ∈ L restricts our choices for B 13 [odd] . Nevertheless, we found 2 = |K| possible modular differences K + (out of 256 = |K |) which are consistent to the XOR-difference K ⊕ given below.
Note that the precomputation step of the attack has to be done only once. It has a complexity of about 2 · 2 32 round computations of Tiger. This is approximately about 2 28.5 evaluations of the compression function of Tiger.
4.2 Compute B 9 , C 9 , and C 10
In this step of the attack, we have to compute B 9 , C 9 and C 10 . Therefore, we first choose random values for B 4 and B 5 and compute A 5 = (B 4 odd(B 5 )) mult.
Since there is a difference in the MSB of X 5 and no differences in B 4 and C 4 , we also get ∆ (B 5 ) = I and ∆ (A 5 ) = A * 5
A 5 . Note that there is no difference in C 5 , since there are no differences in A 4 and B 5 [even] .
Second, we choose a random value for B 6 . Since there is a difference in ∆ ⊕ (X 6 ) = I and no difference in C 5 , we also know the modular difference of ∆ (B 6 ) = (B 6 ⊕ I ) B 6 . Once we know B 6 and B * 6 = B 6 ∆ (B 6 ), we can calculate B 9 , C 9 , C 10 (and B * 9 , C * 9 , C * 10 ) by choosing random values for X 7 , . . . , X 9 and X 10 [even]. This step of the attack has a complexity of about 12 round computations of Tiger and fixes the message words X 7 , . . . , X 9 and X 10 [even].
Constructing the XOR-difference
To construct the XOR-difference K ⊕ in round 11, we use the message modification technique described in Section 3.2. For all modular differences K + ∈ K , we do a message modification step and check if ∆ ⊕ (C 11 ) = K ⊕ . Since the Hamming weight of K ⊕ is 8, this holds with a probability of 2 −8 . Furthermore, the message modification step has a probability of 2 −1 . Hence, this step of the attack succeeds with a probability of 2 evaluations of the compression function of Tiger. 
∆ ⊕ (C 12 ) = L ⊕
Once we have fixed X 11 [odd] and X 12 [even], we can compute B 11 , C 11 and C 12 as well as the according modular differences. In order to construct the needed difference ∆ ⊕ (A 13 ) = I in round 13, we apply again a message modification step. Since the XOR-difference and the modular difference is the same for differences in the MSB, we do not need to compute the list of modular differences that are consistent to the XOR-difference I for the message modification step. This step of the attack succeeds with a probability of 2 −1 and determines the message words X 12 [odd] and X 13 [even].
Once we have fixed the message words, we can compute B 12 , C 12 and C 13 as well as the according modular differences. In order to guarantee that ∆ (B 12 ) can be canceled by ∆ (odd(B 13 )), we need that ∆ (B 12 ) ∈ K. Since the number of modular differences ∆ (B 12 ) = K + consistent to K ⊕ is |K | = 2 8 and |K| = 2, the probability that ∆ (B 12 ) ∈ K is 2 −7 . Hence, we have to repeat the attack about 2 · 2 7 times to finish this step of the attack. This determines the message words X 12 [odd], X 13 [even] and X 13 [odd] and has a complexity of about (2 43.6 + (2 32 + 2 32 )) · 2 8 ≈ 2 51.6 round computations of Tiger. This is about 2 47 evaluations of the compression function of Tiger. Once we have fixed X 13 [odd] and X 13 , we can compute A 13 , B 13 and C 13 as well as the according modular differences. In order to guarantee that ∆ (B 13 ) can be canceled in round 14 by ∆ (odd(B 14 ) ), we need that ∆ (B 13 ) ∈ L. Due to the choice of L ⊕ and K ⊕ in the precomputation step this holds with probability 1.
Hence, we can construct a pseudo-collision in the compression function of Tiger after 17 rounds, respectively after 24 rounds with a complexity close to 2 47 evaluations of the compression function of Tiger.
4.6 Computing the message words X 0 , . . . , X 7
The attack fixes the message words X 7 , . . . , X 13 and X 14 [odd] . To compute the message words X 0 , . . . , X 7 we use the inverse key schedule of Tiger. Therefore, we choose a random value for X 14 [even] and compute X 15 as follows:
This guarantees that X 7 is correct after computing the key schedule backward.
Since the characteristic we use for the key schedule of Tiger has a probability 2 −1 to hold, we expect that we have to repeat this step of the attack (for a different value of X 14 [even]) about two times such that the characteristic holds in the key schedule of Tiger. This adds negligible cost to the attack complexity.
Computing the initial value IV
Once we have computed the message words X 0 , . . . , X 7 , we can run the rounds 6, 5, . . . , 0 backwards to get the initial value IV . Since there is a difference I induced in round 1 by X 1 , we have to inject the same difference in the initial value to cancel it out, namely
Since the difference is in the MSB, this happens with probability 1. Of course, the feed forward destroys the pseudo-collision. After the feed forward we get the same output differences as in the initial values.
Hence, we get a 1-bit circular pseudo-near-collision for the Tiger hash function with a complexity of about 2 47 evaluations of the compression function of Tiger. Note that for an ideal hash function with a hash value of 192-bit one would expect a complexity of about 2 90 to construct a pseudo-near-collision with a 1-bit difference.
A pseudo-collision for 23 rounds of Tiger
In a similar way as we construct the pseudo-near-collision for the full Tiger hash function, we can also construct a pseudo-collision (free-start-collision) for Tiger reduced to 23 rounds by using another characteristic for the key schedule. For the attack we use the key schedule differences given below. It holds with probability 1. as well as the according modular differences. Since the difference in B 10 can be cancel out with a probability close to 2 −7 (cf. Section 4.5), we have to repeat the attack about 2 7 times. Hence, finishing this step of the attack has a complexity of about 2 47 hash computations. 6. Determine X 11 [odd] and X 12 [odd] according to the result of the precomputation step. This adds no additional cost to the attack complexity. 7. To compute the message words X 0 , . . . , X 7 , we have to choose suitable values for X 12 [even] and X 13 , . . . , X 15 such that X 5 , X 6 and X 7 are correct after computing the key schedule backward. Note that X 3 and X 4 can be chosen freely, because we can modify C 2 and C 3 such that C 2 ⊕ X 3 and C 3 ⊕ X 4 stay constant. In detail, we choose arbitrary values for X 13 ,X 14 , X 15 and calculate X 13 , . . . , X 15 as follows.
X 13 = (X 5 + (X 12 + (X 11 ⊕ (¬X 10 23)))) ⊕ X 12 X 14 = (X 6 − (X 13 ⊕ X 12 ⊕ (¬(X 12 + (X 11 ⊕ (¬X 10 23))) 23))) + X 13 X 15 = (X 7 ⊕ (X 14 − X 13 )) − (X 14 ⊕ 0123456789ABCDEF)
This adds negligible cost to the attack complexity and guarantees that X 5 , X 6 and X 7 are always correct after computing the key schedule backward. Hence, we can construct a pseudo-collision (free-start-collision) for Tiger reduced to 23 rounds with a complexity of about 2 47 applications of the compression function.
Conclusion
In this article, we have shown a 1-bit circular pseudo-near-collision for the full Tiger hash function with a complexity of about 2 47 evaluations of the compression function of Tiger. This is the first attack on the full Tiger hash function. Furthermore, we show a pseudo-collision for Tiger reduced to 23 (out of 24) rounds with the same complexity. Our attack is based on the attack of Kelsey and Lucks on round-reduced variants of the Tiger hash function. This work shows that the security margins of the Tiger hash function are not as good as one would expect.
